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COMMENTS
DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES:
STATUTORY RIGHT TO RECUSAL AND THE
1974 AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 28
by Terri J. Lacy
The right to a trial before an impartial judge constitutes one of the basic
aspects of procedural due process. Since 1792 the Federal Judicial Code has
contained provisions for disqualification of federal judges unable to preside
fairly and impartially over a trial. One statute, section 144' under the current
Code, involves recusal 2 of a judge on motion by one of the parties to a
pending action. Another provision, section 455,3 deals with disqualification
of the judge on his own initiative.
This Comment discusses the statutory right to recusal under both sections
144 and 455, with particular attention being paid to the 1974 amendments to
section 455. Prior to the enactment of these amendments, courts experienced difficulty in achieving consistent application of the recusal statutes.
Under section 144 a judge could be disqualified only by ruling on a motion
made by a party for extrajudicial bias or prejudice, whereas under the
original section 455 a judge could disqualify himself under circumstances
often unrelated to bias or prejudice. Other difficulties in interpreting preamended section 455 further stifled uniform interpretation of the requirements for recusal.
These inconsistencies resulted in the 1974 amendment of section 455. The
amendments attempt to create uniformity between sections 144 and 455.4
Unfortunately, revision of the statute has aroused controversy: (1) the
statute does not clarify whether the procedural requirements of section 144
must be met in order to perfect an appeal under the revised section 455; (2)
the amendments fail to make apparent whether the requirement of extrajudicial bias or prejudice for recusal under section 144 is now applicable to the
bias or prejudice provisions in the revised section 455; and (3) the definitions
of "impartiality" and "interest" as used in the amended statute are unclear.
Through an examination of the statutory history of section 455 and section
144 this Comment explores resolutions to the controversies surrounding
these issues.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
2. The verb "to recuse" derives from the old English law, where persons who wilfully
absented themselves from their parish churches were called "recusants." In both civil and
common law jurisdictions today, it refers to the disqualification of a judge from hearing a case
because of interest or prejudice. BLACK'S LAW DiCrIONARY 1442 (4th ed. 1961).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975).
4. The revised § 455 provides for disqualification of a judge in circumstances similar to
those delineated in § 144.
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144

AND

455 PRIOR TO THE 1974 AMENDMENTS

The early United States concept of recusal, borrowed from English common law,5 disqualified a judge from hearing a case when he had a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the case, when he had a relationship to a party, or
when he had previously acted as counsel in the case. 6 The statutory rights to
recusal, however, broadened these categories 7 to include disqualification on

the basis of bias. While at common law only certain types of facts which
might be likely to cause bias could be alleged as a reason for disqualification, statutory protection made it possible to disqualify a judge on the basis
of facts which might indicate the possible presence of bias. Thus, the
appearance of impartiality, as well as impartiality in fact, was to be provided
the litigant.8 At present, sections 144 and 455 are the major statutory provisions for recusal in the federal courts.'
A.

Section 144: Procedural and Substantive Requirements

Section 144 provides for disqualification of a judge for bias or prejudice
upon the filing of an affidavit by one of the parties to the suit in question."l
5. The fundamental principle that a man may not be a judge in his own case was
recognized at common law as early as Coke's time and was later extended to include judges
who had an economic interest in a case, even though not named as parties. Dr. Bonham's Case,
8 Co. Rep. 1136, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1609). Eventually, however, English courts applied
disqualification to cases when the judge was shown to have a "substantial," as opposed to a
"pecuniary," interest in the outcome of the case. The meaning of "substantial interest" was
illustrated in The Queen v. Meyer, I Q.B.D. 173 (1875).
6. In Commonwealth v. McLane, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 427 (1855), a Massachusetts court
held that a justice of the peace who ordered a defendant he recognized to appear in court at the
next criminal term possessed pecuniary interest in the case and should have been disqualified.
If the defendant had failed to make his appearance, the forfeiture incurred under recognizance
would have been paid to the town in which the justice of the peace presided. In Stuart v.
Commonwealth, 91 Va. 152, 21 S.E. 246 (1895), the judge had served as the attorney for the
purpose of attaching the name of a surety to the bond of a county treasurer. The judge was held
disqualified to approve the bond because he had served as "counsel in the case."
7. See note 9 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of recusal provisions in
various states see Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947). Frank compares
contemporary New Mexico and Pennsylvania statutes, characterizing New Mexico as an
"easy" disqualification state which did not allow the judge to determine whether to disqualify
himself. The Pennsylvania legislature, on the other hand, emphasized a judge's duty to disqualify himself if his impartiality could be questioned. Id. at 609.
8. For example, the court in Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 5%, 5% (D.C. Cir. 1941),
states: "The policy underlying Section 21 is that the courts of the United States 'shall not only
be impartial in the controversies submitted to them but shall give assurance that they are
impartial'; i.e., shall appear to be impartial." (Emphasis added.)
9. The first federal provision to deal with disqualification was § 20 of the 1789 Judicial
Code. Section 20 served as the predecessor for the existing § 455. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, §
I1, 1 Stat. 279. Section 21, enacted in 1911, served as the model for § 144. Act of Mar. 3, 1911,
ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090. A third statute, § 47 of the 1948 Judicial Code, provides that no
judge shall hear or determine an appeal from a decision of a case or issue tried by him on the
lower level. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970). This section obviously applies only to appellate judges. Its
meaning requires little interpretation. The statute has no effect on interpretation of the new §
455, and notice only is taken of it here.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). The statute reads:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending
has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be
assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of
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There is some evidence that the predecessor of section 144, section 21 of the
old Judicial Code, was intended to make disqualification automatic upon the

filing of an affidavit of bias or prejudice."' The Supreme Court, however,
early held that the challenged judge may decide whether the affidavit meets
the procedural requirements of the statute and whether
the alleged facts give
2
"fair support" to the charge of bias or prejudice.1
A strict application of the affidavit requirement ensures that the statute
will not be abused by litigants who hope to paralyze court proceedings.13
Protection.from such procedural paralysis is the result of the requirement
that the affidavit must state specific facts which support the allegations of

bias and prejudice, must be filed within strict time limits, and that no litigant
may file more than one affidavit.14 Due to the problem of long court calendars, these precautions are essential to judicial efficiency.
Examination of the procedural provisions reveals further rationales for
each. Specificity of facts in the affidavit is required to show that the
litigant's fear of bias is well-founded. 5 Although the judge may not rule on
the falsity of the allegations, and must accept them as true, 6 he has a duty to
determine whether the affidavit states facts rather than conclusions: 17
rumors and gossip are insufficient."8 Unfortunately, the degree of factual
specificity required has not been determined. 9 The best approach is to avoid
establishment of rigid guidelines by placing emphasis on whether the facts
would fairly convince a sane and reasonable mind that a judge does in fact
20
harbor personal bias or prejudice as the statute contemplates.
the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for
failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any
case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it
is made in good faith.
11. See 46 CONG. REC. 2627 (1911) (remarks of Rep. Cullop).
12. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1921). This holding has been followed
consistently. See, e.g., Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944); Currin v. Nourse, 74
F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729 (1935). See Note, Disqualification of Judges
for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (1966), where the author suggests
that this practice seems inconsistent with the rationale of § 144. He finds that the litigant's
confidence in his chances for a fair trial may be undermined by the knowledge that the judge he
believes to be biased against him is the judge ruling on the contention of bias. The author
suggests that another district judge could rule on the affidavit's sufficiency; however, he notes
the sensitive position in which this places the second judge. "A better procedure would be to
have the affidavit filed directly with the circuit court of appeals for determination of its
sufficiency." Id.
13. Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 44 (1913); United States v. Valenti,
120 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1954).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
15. See Note, supra note 12, at 1441.
16. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 23 F.
Supp. 880, 882-83 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd, 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939).
17. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 23 (1921). The Court in Berger did recognize that
the affiant may not be able to ascertain the details of the facts which give rise to his apprehension. The Court therefore ruled that the affidavit may allege facts based upon information and
belief. Id. at 34. It should be adequate for the affiant to state the facts and the source of his
belief that they are true; however, some courts have gone so far as to find allegations based on
newspaper and magazine reports unacceptable as "hearsay." See, e.g., Tucker v. Kerner, 186
F.2d 79, 84 (7th Cir. 1950).
18. Compare United States v. Parker, 23 F. Supp. 880 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd, 103 F.2d 857
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939), with Nations v. United States, 14 F.2d 507 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 735 (1926).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 245 F. Supp. 772, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); United
States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384, 392 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
20. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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Since the judge must accept the facts in the affidavit as true, protection
from false allegation is supposedly provided by the requirement that counsel
certify that the affidavit and application are made in good faith. It is not
clear, however, as to whose good faith counsel certifies.21 Since section 144
is intended to dispel the litigant's fear of bias, many courts have held that
counsel need only certify a belief that the affiant is filing the affidavit in
good faith.22 Other courts, however, have ruled that counsel must certify his
own good faith as well.23 The latter view is preferable because it would
prevent an attorney from convincing his client to file an affidavit for delay
purposes and then certifying his belief in the affiant's good faith. Risk of
personal reprimand to the attorney is likely to discourage use of a section
144 affidavit as a delay tactic.24
Another area of controversy centers around who may qualify as "counsel
of record." Generally, the certifying attorney must have appeared in the
case at an earlier stage,2 5 but that appearance may not always be sufficient to
make the attorney the counsel of record. In one case26 the attorney had not
been admitted to the federal bar at the time the affidavit was filed. He was,
therefore, unable to be adjudged a proper certifying counsel, and the recusal
motion was not entertained. 27 Although this result may seem harsh, an even
harsher judgment has arisen when a litigant was without attorney at the time
the affidavit was filed.2" When the court does not inform itself whether a
party is honestly without counsel, the litigant may be deprived unfairly of
his rights under section 144.
The affiant must also file the affidavit in accordance with strict time
limits.29 This time requirement prohibits the use of section 144 as a delaying
tactic3" and is, therefore, construed as strictly as the other procedural
provisions of the statute. 3 The statutory deadline of ten days has become
obsolete, however, with the abolition of formal terms of court.32 Obsolescence of the deadline provision weakens the force of the entire statute in the
administration of efficient justice. Section 144 should be amended to permit
district courts to set deadlines suitable to their own schedules.3 3 Such a
21. See Orfield, Recusation of Federal Judges, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 799, 810-11 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Flegenheimer v. United States, 110 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1936).
23. See, e.g., In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (Ist Cir. 1961).
24. See Note, supra note 12, at 1443.
25. See, e.g., Currin v. Nourse, 74 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729
(1935); Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F.2d 582 (W.D. Tenn. 1924).
26. Currin v. Nourse, 74 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729 (1935).
27. Id. at 275-76.
28. Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 702 (1942). In
Mitchell the litigant had been represented by counsel earlier in the case. The counsel had
withdrawn, but had not formally notified the court. The court therefore ruled that the litigant
was not officially without attorney at the time the affidavit was filed.
29. Section 144 provides that "the affidavit.., shall be filed not less than ten days before
the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown
for failure to file it within such time."
30. See Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1913).
31. See Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
33. Some courts have already set up second deadlines on their own to meet this dilemma.
See, e.g., Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1944) (court requires filing before participation in proceedings); United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (court requires

filing before participation in proceedings).
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process would lend flexibility to the statute in that each district would be
allowed to determine its own time needs and would thus be able to increase
the effectiveness of this statutory process.
Whatever the deadline may be, it is inevitable that some affiants will argue
they have "good cause" for filing late.34 "Good cause" would seem to be a
discretionary matter," determined by the same judge the affiant is attempting to disqualify. The practicality of such discretionary measures, when
balanced against the burden of formulating a rigid test, would seem to
outweigh any inconsistencies that might appear in judicial definitions of
"good cause." Moreover, the appellate procedure should correct any abuse
of discretion by a judge unwilling to entertain an affidavit which questioned
his fitness to hear a case.
Since only one affidavit may be filed by a litigant, a second judge's bias or
prejudice may not be questioned under section 144 by the party who disqualified the first judge.36 This puts a burden on the substitute judge to disqualify
himself if there is any chance that he may not be entirely impartial; a litigant
may be prejudiced if the second judge fails to disqualify himself even though
he may be biased in his disposition of the case.
The burden of disqualification that falls on the first judge under section
144 has been given two primary interpretations. While some courts hold that
the judge may use his discretion as to disqualification even if the affidavit is
found insufficient,37 other courts state that it is the duty of the judge to hear
the case if he finds himself unbiased and unprejudiced.3" The meaning of
"personal" bias or prejudice has aroused much discussion in section 144
litigation. 39 The basic rule is that personal bias or prejudice must go directly
to the judge's personal appraisal of the party, and cannot relate merely to
the judge's background and associations.' What constitutes this personal
34. Even if "good cause" is found for missing the deadline, reasonable diligence must be
used in filing the affidavit.
35. Hibdon v. United States, 213 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1954) (failure of uncounselled, but
experienced, defendant to meet the requirement not valid reason); Eisler v. United States, 170
F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949) (death of brother of one of the
litigant's attorneys insufficient for late filing); Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(discovery after the deadline of facts which indicate bias or prejudice valid reason for late
filing); Morris v. United States, 26 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1928) (refusal of counsel to follow
litigant's request to file an affidavit sufficient reason).
36. See United States v. Hoffa, 245 F. Supp. 772, 775-76 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (held that when
defendant had filed affidavit against the first judge, who had withdrawn from case, defendant
could not attempt to recuse second judge).
37. United States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1957). The judge's use of
discretion in disqualification could be viewed as an application of § 455 rather than § 144.
38. See Benedict v. Seiberling, 17 F.2d 831, 841 (N.D. Ohio 1926), where the court stated
that it was improper to withdraw voluntarily when challenged under § 144 because "to allow a
disinclination to further sit in this case to work our voluntary retirement would permit the
authors of this attack . . . to gain unlawfully that which they are not justly entitled to have."
See also Wolfson v. Palmieri, 3% F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d
71 (3d Cir. 1962); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961); Morse v. Lewis, 54
F.2d 1027 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 557 (1932); Klose v. United States, 49 F.2d 177 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 626 (1931); Harris v. Britton, 361 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Okla. 1973);
Carpenter v. Hall, 352 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., I F.2d
582 (W.D. Tenn. 1924).
39. The Court in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1921), provides an excellent
study of the meaning of this phrase.
40. See, e.g., Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1948), appeal dismissed,
338 U.S. 883 (1949) (trial judge in case involving Communist defendant alleged to have
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appraisal of the defendant has, however, proven difficult to define. One of
the most important guidelines developed by the courts is that allegations that
the judge has made rulings adverse to the affiant are not sufficient to require
disqualification." Rather, the bias or prejudice must be extrajudicial in
origin.4 2 The reasoning behind the guideline is based on the theory that an
affiant may actually be dissatisfied with the decisions rather than the
judge.43 Such decisions should be questioned through the appellate process
rather than by disqualification." The guideline has been extended beyond
decisions, however, to statements made by the judge at earlier stages of the
case. 4 5 Although most courts are cautious about disqualifying a judge on the
basis of his conduct during these early proceedings,46 a judge should be
disqualified if his language and actions in the courtroom indicate that he has
formed such a strong opinion against the litigant as to impair his judgment.47
At least one court has recognized the validity of this argument. In Knapp v.
Kinsey4" a party had questioned the judge's impartiality on the basis of his
actions during interrogation of witnesses and his participation in the proceedings.49 The court noted that "the trial judge in the federal court is more
than a mere arbitrator to rule upon objections and to instruct the jury." 50 He
had the right to conduct the trial in such a way that the issues were clear and
particular interest in deportation of Communists and to have advised investigator in same
investigation); Price v. Johnston, 125 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 677 (1942)
(trial judge associated with bank in vicinity of bank where robbery was committed by the
defendant).
41. See, e.g., Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
914 (1958) (judge made adverse rulings in criminal proceeding); Littleton v. DeLashmutt, 188
F.2d 973 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951) (judge had made adverse rulings against
farmer-debtors in bankruptcy proceedings); In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943)
(Special Master in bankruptcy proceedings had entered orders adverse to appellants); Refior v.
Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 671 (1942) (petitioner
filed affidavit after judge ruled adversely to his cause); Walker v. United States, 116 F.2d 458
(9th Cir. 1940) (judge had asked another judge to try contempt proceeding in case because he
would have to "lean too far backwards"). The rule was first stated by way of dictum in Ex
parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1913).
42. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). In Tynan v. United States,
376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967), it was held that a distinction must be
drawn between judicial determination derived from evidence and lengthy proceedings before
the court and a determination not so founded upon facts brought forth in court, but based on
attitudes and conceptions that have origins outside the courtroom.
43. See Note, supra note 12, at 1447. Such reasoning was applied in Calvaresi v. United
States, 216 F.2d 891, 900 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'd per curiam, 348 U.S. 961 (1955), where the
Tenth Circuit held that imposition of sentences which are very severe, but which are within
legal limits, does not, by itself, establish personal bias or prejudice. The Supreme Court
reversed this decision, however, and remanded the case for retrial under a different judge.
44. A severe limit on the power of appeal exists, however, since many rulings are made
under the trial court's discretionary powers.
45. See, e.g., Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205, 215 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
354 U.S. 156 (1957).
46. The judge must be allowed to perform his judicial function, a function which involves
forming an opinion about the case before him. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d
Cir. 1943).
47. See Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (judgment reversed where
judge had made hostile remarks about plaintiff and directed verdict for defendant). This
argument is particularly forceful early in a trial before the judge has an opportunity to form
opinions about the parties.
48. 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956).
49. The trial judge in Knapp, a stockholders' suit, frequently threatened the defendants
with the possibility of criminal proceedings, and often offered advice to the plaintiffs in the
preparation of their case.
50. Id. at 466.
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the evidence understood, and might interrogate witnesses for such a purpose.5 1 The court noted, however, that these rights were limited; remarks of
a judge clearly manifesting his hostility to one of the parties indicates a
personal bias or prejudice.5 2 In Knapp the trial judge was viewed by the
appellate court as having "stepped down from the bench to assume the role
actions were held to have demonof advocate for the plaintiff."" These
54
prejudice.
or
bias
strated personal
A second guideline established by the courts is that personal bias or
prejudice is rarely found on the basis of allegations that a judge has prede-55
termined the merits of a case. The Fifth Circuit indicated in Henry v. Speer
that preconceived opinions on the facts in issue does not mean a judge is
personally biased and prejudiced against any of the parties. 6 In that case the
trial judge had expressed an opinion concerning the facts of the litigation to
a local newspaper. The correctness of the reasoning in Henry v. Speer has
been and should be questioned. 7 When the judge's opinions are specifically
related to the litigants or issues in the case before him, an allegation of
personal bias or prejudice would be proper. Such a view would certainly be
supported by the desire not only for impartiality in fact, but for an appearance of impartiality as well.
The problem of predetermination by a judge can be analyzed in three
ways: (1) where the judge has previously tried a case involving one of the
parties to the present case; (2) where the judge has tried a case involving the
same issue as in the pending case; (3) where the judge has expressed some
opinion concerning a class to which the party belongs.58 In cases where the
judge has previously tried a case involving one of the parties, arguably the
party has already had his "day in court" in the first proceeding; the second
case thus represents an entirely distinct "day in court." Nonetheless, an
unfavorable opinion formed in an earlier case may carry over into the later
case. In fact it would seem difficult for a judge not to allow such an opinion
to affect his reasoning. The courts, however, have failed to find that such an
59
unfavorable opinion constitutes personal bias or prejudice. In Barry v.
Sigler' the trial judge was familiar with a party and his legal difficulties from
51. Id. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160, 170 (8th Cir. 1935); Lewis v.
United States, II F.2d 745, 747 (6th Cir. 1926).
52. 232 F.2d at 466.
53. Id. at 467.
54. Id.
55. 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913).
56. Id. at 871. See also Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 13 F.2d 497 (D. Mass. 1926)
(judge expressed opinion of person in open court prior to said person's entry into case as
defendant).
57. Although some courts may be able to distinguish between "personal bias and prejudice" and prejudgment on the merits, it would be difficult to say that a litigant who fails to make
the same distinction is being unreasonable. For a good discussion of this problem, see Note,
supra note 12, at 1449.
58. Instances where personal bias or prejudice have not been found after allegation of
predetermination include a case involving the communication of prejudice from another judge
to the presiding judge and prejudicial statements of a third person not made to the defendants or
the judge in the case. See, e.g., Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1935).
59. See cases cited in Ratner, Disqualificationof Judges ForPriorJudicialActions, 3 How.
L.J. 228 (1957), for a discussion of this failure in both federal and state courts.
60. 373 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1967).
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prior cases. The party claimed that the judge's familiarity with him caused
personal bias or prejudice and that citation of the party for contempt in the
pending case was the result of the bias. According to the Eighth Circuit,
familiarity with a litigant did not imply personal feelings toward that individual. 6 Another case involved a special master who had made several
adverse rulings against a party in earlier actions in a bankruptcy proceeding.62 The party filed an affidavit to disqualify the same judge in the latest
action. The appellate court upheld the judge's decision not to disqualify
himself, noting that "[tihe standard of dispassionateness obviously does not
require the judge to rid himself of the unconscious influence of [basic
predilections inhering in our legal system]." 63
The court in Craven v. United States64 commented that recusal procedures
were not developed to cripple courts by disqualification of a judge solely on
the basis of a bias against wrongdoers acquired from evidence in the course
of judicial proceedings before him .6 This is a valid argument, not only for
efficient judicial organization, but also because judges, as human beings, are
to some degree biased. In this case the bias is productively channeled
toward protection from wrongdoers. Open and obvious bias for past
wrongs, however, may prevent the litigant who has appeared before a judge
in a prior proceeding from receiving a fair trial in a pending case. Such a
litigant deserves a more careful determination of that judge's bias or prejudice than often occurs. A bias not extrajudicial in origin could be as detrimental to the litigant's rights as the most inflammatory personal bias. A
balancing approach, which would weigh the interests of the judge, other
litigants in the case, and society as a whole against those of the affiant would
be appropriate in this situation.
A similar problem arises when the judge has previously tried a case which
involved facts in issue identical to those in a pending case. No one would
claim that a party in a patent infringement action could disqualify the judge
simply because he had heard other patent infringement actions. When the
judge has already determined the validity of the patent in question in a prior
proceeding, however, an affiant's fear that the judge will not approach the
issues with an open mind seems reasonable. The issue is whether this fear is
sufficient cause for disqualification of a judge. In Denis v. PerfectParts" the
court did not so find. According to the court "[section 144] is directed to
personal bias, not to previous judicial exposure to the same or similar
questions. 67 Concern that the appearance of impartiality is not protected by
this reading of the statute is well-founded; a balancing test would meet such
a concern.
61. Id. at 836.
62. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943). The case was a continuation of the
bankruptcy proceedings.
63. Id. at 652.
64. 22 F.2d 605 (lst Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 627 (1928).
65. Id. at 607-08.
66. 142 F. Supp. 263 (D. Mass. 1956). The trial judge in that case had previously determined
the validity of the patent involved in the pending infringement action.

67. Id.
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Finally, a similar problem arises when a party claims that a judge may be
biased or prejudiced against an affiant because he is a member of a particular class. Although the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States found the
trial judge disqualified to hear cases of Germans accused of espionage
because he had expressed strong anti-German sentiment, 8 most courts hold
that a judge's feelings toward a class do not represent personal bias or
prejudice against the affiant himself. United States v. Fujimoto69 involved a
Smith Act 70 prosecution in which it was alleged by affidavit that the defendant had made prior attacks against the judge in a newspaper, that the judge
had made previous statements concerning the Smith Act, and that the judge
had once objected to a speaker at a dedication ceremony because of the
speaker's connection with Communist groups. The trial judge held that no
personal bias or prejudice against the defendant had been demonstrated. 7 In
Eisler v. United States72 the District of Columbia Circuit found that the
judge's prior activities in investigation of Communists and sponsorship of
legislation for the deportation of Communists did not demonstrate personal
bias toward the affiant, an alien Communist." In Foster v. Medina74 an
affidavit was filed which alleged that the judge had refused to grant the
defendant's motion for continuance when there might be more Communists
up to the same "sort of thing" as those before the court. Moreover, in
answer to the argument that the indictment alleged no acts of violence, the
judge replied, "No, they want to wait until they get everything set and then
the acts will come." 75 These allegations were ruled insufficient for stating
personal bias or prejudice; the court found that such remarks were aimed at
a class to which the defendants belonged and not at the defendants themselves.76
The best example of narrow and unreasonable definitional limits of bias
under section 144 is found in Cole v. Loew's, Inc.7 Cole, a motion picture
script writer, had been suspended by his employer following an appearance
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He subsequently
brought suit against the employer. The defendants sought to disqualify the
judge on the grounds that he had a personal bias against them. They filed an
affidavit stating that in a discussion at the home of friends the judge had said
that he felt there was no legal justification for suspension of employees
brought before the House Committee and that he hoped none of the cases
68. 255 U.S. at 33-34.
69. 101 F. Supp. 293 (D. Hawaii 1951).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970). The act prohibits advocacy of the overthrow of the United
States Government by force or violence.
71. 101 F. Supp. at 295.
72. 170 F.2d 273 (D.C.Cir.), cert. granted, 335 U.S. 857 (1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S.
883 (1949). See Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Courts, I1 U. Prr.
L. REV. 415, 421-23 (1950), for a critical
discussion of the case. Schwartz finds that the
appearance of impartiality was inadequately protected under Eisler.
73. 170 F.2d at 278. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but when the defendant became
a fugitive, the court left the case off the docket, 338 U.S. 189 (1949), and then dismissed the
petition, 338 U.S. 883 (1949).
74. 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909 (1949).
75. Id. at 633.
76. Id. at 633-34.
77. 76 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
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stemming from such suspensions came before him because he would be
obliged to render judgments for the plaintiffs. The judge, treating these
statements as true,7" found the facts insufficient to show personal bias.7 9 He
classified the statements merely as preconceived ideas of the law. °
The holding in Loew's has been cogently criticized. One author found that
the lack of a requirement in section 144 to prove prejudice serves as notice
that the intent of the statute is to relieve the litigant of a judge in whom he
has no confidence, rather than only to provide a remedy against actual bias.
The decision in Loew's had not relieved the litigant of such a judge."' Not
only did the court's opinion in the case reflect a lack of open-mindedness, it
also impaired the appearance of a fair trial, the precise protection the statute
was designed to provide. The Loew's holding demonstrates the extreme
results which a narrow construction of section 144 can produce. Such a
construction may seem to eliminate "an intolerable obstruction to the efficient conduct of judicial proceedings,- 82 but at the same time it appears to
create an "intolerable obstruction" to a litigant's desire for judicial impartiality. If the courts cannot expand their interpretation of "bias or prejudice" to the limits of the present statute, a balancing test would provide
better protection.
B. Section 455: Interest of Justice or Judge
The other major statutory method of recusal, prior to its 1974 amendment,
provided for disqualification by the judge himself in a proceeding in which
he had a substantial interest, had been of counsel, was or had been a
material witness, or was so related or connected to any party or attorney as
to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to serve as judge.8 3 Section 455
consisted of two major provisions: mandatory circumstances under which a
judge should disqualify himself, and circumstances under which a judge had
discretion. The discretionary part of section 455 provided that the judge
might in his discretion recuse himself if he felt so related to or connected
with a party or an attorney as to render it improper for him to sit. The
mandatory provision required that the judge must disqualify himself if he
had a substantial interest in the case, had been of counsel, or had served as a
material witness in the case.
Mandatory Disqualification.84 Each of the three categories of mandatory
disqualification has been the subject of judicial interpretation. "Substantial
78. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
79. 76 F. Supp. 872, 881 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
80. Id. at 876. The expression of opinion was, however, in effect an opinion on the merits
and thus the affiant should have been entitled to relief.
81. See Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Personal Bias, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 349,
351 (1949), for a good discussion of this case.
82. Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 608 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 627
(1928).
83. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 908 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V
1975)).
84. See Ex parte N.K. Fairbark Co., 194 F. 978, 987-90 (M.D. Ala. 1912), for a discussion
of the mandatory nature of this branch of § 455. Failure of the judge to disqualify himself was
error which would normally be corrected on appeal from a final judgment, although in some
cases a writ of mandamus might be considered proper. See, e.g., United States v. Vasilick, 160
F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947); In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917).
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5
interest" has been interpreted to refer to pecuniary or beneficial interest .
As in Adams v. United States,86 the phrase's meaning has also been held to
include the interest that a lawyer has in "pushing" his case to a successful
outcome. The court in Adams still did not find, however, that "substantial
interest" existed in the case. The trial judge had been employed as the
United States Attorney when the defendant in the pending perjury case had
been tried for a liquor violation. It was during the first trial that the defendant had committed the alleged perjury. The judge had no knowledge that the
first trial had occurred when he was connected with the United States
Attorney's office. It was held, therefore, that no "substantial interest"
existed, since there was neither prior knowledge of the facts involved in the
perjury case nor prior interest in an issue arising out of the facts.8 7 Such a
decision is proper under the facts of the case. In other holdings under the
"substantial interest" provision it has been found that a judge who was a
depositor in a bank, the stock of which was held in a trust, did not possess
"pecuniary interest" in a suit for an accounting of the trust estate and for
damages for maladministration of the trust."8 A judge has been disqualified,
however, for owning stock in oil companies against which suits had been
brought to recover possession of land and judgments for the value of
extracted oil.8 9 An interest such as the latter is more direct and, therefore,
more likely to influence the judge's decision in the case. The appearance of
impartiality thus seems to have been adequately protected under the "substantial interest" branch of the statute.
The mandatory provision of section 455 which originally required disqualification by a judge who had been of counsel in the case has also been
analyzed by the courts. This provision was directed primarily at judges who
had been attorneys in a case prior to their judicial appointment. It has thus
been interpreted not to affect the jurisdiction of a judge who has merely
reviewed and made suggestions concerning papers prepared by an attorney
acting on the judge's behalf in a mandamus proceeding which arose from the
pending case.' "Counsel in the case" has definitely been interpreted, however, to include United States Attorneys in criminal prosecutions. In United
States v. Vasilick9" a judge was held disqualified to hear a motion to vacate
85.

United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947

(1966).
86. 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962).
87. Id. 'at 310. It was similarly determined unnecessary to require disqualification in Neil v.

United States, 205 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1953), where the judge before whom a couple was seeking
to recover federal income taxes had been the Collector of Internal Revenue when the allegedly
incorrect returns were filed. The judge knew nothing about the case prior to the trial. See
Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958),
where the test of prior knowledge or interest was delineated.
88. Long v. Stites, 63 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 640 (1933).
89. In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917). But see Kinnear-Weed Corp.

v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d (5th Cir. 1968) (stock ownership must be substantialunder

1948 revision of § 455); Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 43 (1970).
90. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F.2d 87, 89(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
899 (1966). In Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1964), the court
reached a similar interpretation, strengthening the argument by noting that the judge had held
only one meeting, mainly social, with the attorney.
91. 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947).
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judgment because he had been the district attorney when the defendant was
tried and the judgment entered.92 Similarly, in United States v. Maher 93 the
court found the fact that the judge had been a United States Attorney in
prior proceedings of the same case sufficient interest for disqualification
even though the defendant had pleaded guilty. These two cases reflect the
necessity for a direct involvement by the judge in the pending case while still
a United States Attorney. 94 The same factor of directness was required in
the above determination of what constitutes "substantial interest" for purposes of disqualification. The requirement of direct involvement assures the
litigant an appearance of impartiality under both provisions.
The third circumstance requiring disqualification is where a judge has
been a "material witness" in the case. This condition has been interpreted
by the courts as narrowly as the first and second provisions. The provision
was construed so that a judge passing upon a motion to vacate a sentence
imposed by him was not a "material witness" within the meaning of the
statute. 95 Neither was a judge before whom a motion was heard to withdraw
a guilty plea in a pending case.'
Discretionary Disqualification. As originally written, section 455 provided
the judge with discretion to recuse himself if he felt that he was so related to
or connected with a party or an attorney as to render it improper for him to
decide a case. In Harris v. United States97 it was determined not to be an
abuse of discretion to hear a case to vacate a judgment convicting a bankrupt of concealing property from his bankruptcy estate and giving false
testimony before the bankruptcy court, even though the judge's brother-inlaw was trustee of the bankruptcy estate. In Voltmann v. United States9" the
court found it unnecessary for a judge to recuse himself because his son-inlaw was a member of the firm representing the defendant, when the son-inlaw had nothing to do with the case. Further, it has been held no abuse of
discretion to hear a case in which a professional acquaintance is one of the
92. Id. at 632. The writer of the opinion in Vasilick noted that a judge would not be
disqualified when he had been of counsel for one of the parties, but in a different case. Id. at
632. See The Richmond, 9 F. 863, 864 (E.D. La. 1881), in which the court stated: "The
decisions. . . are unanimous that 'of counsel' means 'of counsel for a parity in that cause and in
that controversy,' and if either the cause or controversy is not identical the disqualification
does not exist." In Carr v. Fife, 156 U.S. 494 (1895), recusal was held to be discretionary where
the judge had served the defendant as an attorney in matters unrelated to the pending case.
93. 88 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. Me. 1950).
94. Compare the results in Vasilick and Maher with those in Roberson v. United States,
249 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958) (held insufficient for disqualification that judge had been United States Attorney when one of witnesses in case before him had
been prosecuted), and Rose v. United States, 295 F. 687 (4th Cir. 1924) (held insufficient for
disqualification when judge had no recollection of signing indictments as United States Attorney). In these cases, the involvement of the judge as a United States Attorney had been
indirect. Thus, a valid distinction explains the different results in the four cases discussed here.
95. United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1965).
96. United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964).
97. 338 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1964). See In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.
Cal. 1936) (in a regular bankruptcy proceeding, there is no contest, and, thus, relationship to a
party would be of little significance).
98. 147 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1945).
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litigants. 9 In MacNeil Bros. v. Cohen" the First Circuit agreed with the
chief justice of the circuit that he could hear a case in which the dean of a
law school where the judge had been a lecturer was involved.''
These cases imply that the discretionary powers of the judge under the
original section 455 were virtually absolute. The cases also indicate, however, that such power has not been abused; all the cases maintain a reasonable
appearance of impartiality. Recusal of judges under the discretionary provision of section 455 was sought for other interests in addition to those stated,
however, and the discretion of the judge did not always provide the litigant
with as much confidence as the above decisions might have.
In Hobson v. Hansen"2 the plaintiffs were contesting the selection of a
school board as unconstitutional. They challenged the propriety of the
judge's hearing the case on the grounds that he had assisted in the selection
of the board in question. The court on appeal upheld the judge's decision
that he need not recuse himself if he felt it would be proper for him to
preside over the proceedings. This decision, however, overlooks the factor
of direct involvement found to be so significant under the mandatory provisions of section 455. Furthermore, in Coltranev. Templeton 0 3 the court held
that a judge who had filed a suit against the defendant in state court
possessed discretion whether to recuse himself."'4 The appearance of impartiality in such a case is difficult to uphold. Differences in these two rulings
and the other cases discussed under the discretionary provision of section
455 exemplify the internal vagueness of the original section 455, which,
along with discrepancies between the statute and section 144, provoked
much criticism of the statute.
II.

IMPACT OF THE

1974

AMENDMENTS TO SECTION

455

Criticismof Section 144 and the Original Section 455. Several discrepancies
in the operation of sections 144 and the original section 455 are apparent
from the above discussion of the two statutes. These discrepancies were
criticized before the revision of section 455. "5 While it was held that interest
was a sufficient ground for disqualification under section 455," ° prejudice,
other than personal, was inadequate to require recusal under section 144."07
A judge could be held competent to hear a case under section 144 although
he had expressed a premature opinion on the merits'08 and yet he could be
99. See Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1963), where the judge and litigant
shared common membership in certain international legal associations. This was held insufficient to deem recusal necessary. The Tenth Circuit, however, required a judge to disqualify
himself in a case where one of the attorneys had acted as the judge's counsel in other pending
litigation. The fact that the judge had been a litigant here was an added factor to consider.
Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
100. 264 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1959).
101. Id. at 189.
102. 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).
103. 106 F. 370 (4th Cir. 1901).
104. Id. at 376.
105. See, e.g., Note, Disqualification of a Judge on the Ground of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78
(1927).
106. See notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 58-82 supra and accompanying text.
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disqualified under section 455 for an interest as small as being a stockholder
of a company litigant." The justification for such discrepancies appeared to
be the desire to avoid unwarranted attacks and needless delay by narrow
application of recusal statutes. "It is hardly an adequate reason [,however,]
to reject a . . . rule merely because there may be an abuse." 10 This narrow
construction of sections 144 and 455 provided little protection for litigants
desiring judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality.
As mentioned above, section 455 by itself was justifiably criticized for
providing insufficiently detailed and concrete standards to guide judges in
their decisions as to disqualification."' At its annual meeting in August 1969
the American Bar Association decided to formulate the new Code of Judicial
Conduct. This Code, with newly drafted recusal provisions, was suggested
as a replacement for section 455.112 The Code formulation is an imperfect
solution for protection of the possible presence of bias because "personal
bias or prejudice" is used as a standard. It serves as a better reasoned
statute than the original section 455, however, since the guidelines for
recusal are more firmly established.
Statutory Revision. In December 1974, section 455 was radically modified
by the Congress 13 to conform with the provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct." 4 The revised section 455(a)" 5 states that any justice, judge,
109. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
110. Note, supra note 105, at 82.
I11. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV.
736, 741 (1973).
112. Id. at 745.
113. Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974).
114. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT No. 3C(l)(a) (1972). Note, however, a significant
difference between the statute and the Code. The Code states:
(I) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding
Id., whereas the new § 455 states:
(a) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself'in the following circumstances:
(I) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge
or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
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magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy should disqualify himself in any proceeding in which impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Five other
situations are described under section 455(b) in which a judge should disqualify himself: where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party;'16 where in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy; where he has served as a government employee as counsel or
advisor in the proceeding; where he knows that he, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy; or, where he or his
spouse, or a person within third degree of relationship to either of them, is a
party, lawyer, or material witness in the proceeding. Although there can be
no waiver of these section 455(b)" 7 grounds for a disqualification, waiver
may result under section 455(a) in situations in which a judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
The provisions of section 455 as amended are now similar to those contained in section 144. It is not obvious, however, that the procedural requirements of section 144 discussed above must be met in order to perfect an
appeal under section 455.118 The meaning of "interest" and "impartiality" is
not apparent. Further, it is not clear whether the requirement of extrajudicial bias or prejudice under section 144 is now applicable to the bias or
prejudice provisions under the revised section 455.1'9
Procedural Requirements of Section 144 Apply to Section 455. Before 1948 a
party alleging bias or prejudice under section 455 was required to file an
affidavit to that effect. 120 The 1948 revision 121 of section 455 discarded this
requirement. This clearly indicates that the judge should disqualify himself

(c)

(e)

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his
household.

No justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy shall accept from
the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification
enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises
only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded
by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975).
115. Id.
116. This is the same language as found in § 144.
117. Under the former § 455 waiver was held to have occurred in several of the situations
which are now included in § 455(b). In Neil v. United States the plaintiffs had consented to a
judge, the former Collector of Internal Revenue, hearing their action to recover federal income
taxes. Waiver of any objection on the grounds of "substantial interest" was therefore held to
have occurred. 205 F.2d at 125. Waiver was also held to have occurred in Adams v. United
States, where the defendants' counsel raised no timely objection to the fact that the judge had
been the United States Attorney when the defendant was tried for a liquor violation, at which
trial the alleged perjury in Adams took place. 302 F.2d at 309-10.
118. See notes 13-35 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
120. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455
(Supp. V 1975)).
121. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 908 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V
1975)).
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on his own initiative, without the filing of section 144 affidavits. In United
States v. Vasilick, 122 as in other cases, an appeal based on section 455 alone
was allowed where the judge was the district attorney who had signed an
indictment against the defendant. A 1974 decision, Shadid v. Oklahoma
City,'23 found no error in considering the applicability of section 455 disqualification on appeal without affidavits having been filed at the trial level. In
United States v. Seiffert'24 the Fifth Circuit determined on appeal whether
the trial judge should have disqualified himself as "counsel of the case";
this case has been cited as authority to allow an appeal based on section 455
alone in decisions where the substantive arguments for disqualification are
grounded in the 1974 amendments. Thus, in Davis v. Board of School
Commissioners'2 5 the court found that revised section 455 could be asserted
on appeal by itself.' 26 It can, therefore, be determined that the revised
section 455, just as the 1948 model, does not require filing a section 144
affidavit to be used as a basis for assignment of error on appeal. Such a
determination is wise; the judge wishing to disqualify himself, whether or
not a party files an affidavit, should obviously be allowed to do so in the
interest of justice. Furthermore, section 455 would be totally ineffective as
the sole basis of appeal if section 144 requirements had always to be met in
order to utilize section 455 during the appellate process.
Bias or Prejudice Test Under Section 455. It is not as simple to determine the
intended meaning of "impartiality," "financial interest," or "bias or prejudice" under section 455. One helpful guide to the interpretation of "impartiality" is the intent of the ABA in formulating the Code provision from
which section 455 is taken. The Code's general test for disqualification is
whether the judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Use of
the word "might" was intended to indicate that disqualification should
follow if the "reasonable man," were he to know "all the circumstances,"
would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.' 27 The same intent was
noted by the Congress in its adoption of section 455.128 Congress also
apparently intended, as did the ABA, 129 to guarantee not only that a biased
122. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
123. 494 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1974).
124. 501 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1975).
125. 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975).
126. Id. at 1051 (appeal in Davis, however, was based on both §§ 144 and 455). There is
evidence that the ABA recommended that § 455 be amended to ensure that applications be filed
under time requirements as provided for in § 144. No such suggestion would have been
necessary if it had been intended that the procedural requirements of § 144 apply automatically.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6358.
In Ross v. Houston Ind. School Dist., Civ. No. 10,444 (S.D. Tex., motion to disqualify
denied, June 6, 1977), the HISD asked that United States District Judge Noel disqualify himself
from hearing the desegregation case because of incidents involving his own children and the
HISD, including the transfer of his sons out of the HISD and into the SBISD near the time of an
earlier desegregation order against HISD. In Judge Noel's opinion, in which he refused to
disqualify himself, the judge noted that a § 144 affidavit would improperly limit § 455, arguing
that under § 144 the judge is limited to review of the facts presented him in said affidavit,
whereas under the amended § 455 the judge must consider all the facts and circumstances
known to him. Judge Noel subsequently retired from the case before it was disposed of on the
merits.
127. Reporter's Notes to the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (1973).
128. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, reprinted in (1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6355.
The "abuse of discretion" test, however, continues to be used as a criterion for reversal on
appeal. Id.
129. Reporter's Notes to the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 61 (1973).

19771

COMMENTS

judge would not participate in a case, but in addition that no reasonable
person would suspect as much since the appearance of impartiality is an
important goal. 3 ' There are only a few cases under the former section 455
which seem to provide protection for this appearance of impartiality.'31
These cases are significant since they are likely to influence the application
and construction of the new section 455. In Davis v. Board of School
Commissioners the court underscores the significance of the appearance of
impartiality in its recognition of the "reasonable man" test.' Such recognition is likely to be contrasted with the section 144 "personal bias or prejudice" test, particularly as that test is expanded in use under the revised
recusal statute.
Unlike the above provision of section 455, a case concerning the "financial interest" provision has not yet been reported. The legislative history of
section 455, however, implies that the possible presence of bias will be
protected here. A judge will be required to disqualify himself, no matter how
small the interest involved, if that interest is direct.' Such an interpretation
is consistent with readings of the earlier statute, and should eliminate any
ambiguity as to disqualification which could possibly have existed.'34 Additional support for this interpretation comes from the holding in Commonwealth Coatings v. ContinentalCasualty Co. 35 which suggests that a judge's
direct economic or financial interest, even though -small, may be inconsistent with due process.
The Fifth Circuit in Davis notes the significance of interpretation of
"personal bias or prejudice" in section 455.36 The court finds no suggestion
in the legislative history that any meaning other than that of "personal bias
or prejudice" in section 144 was intended. It therefore held that revised
section 455 focuses on a judge's personal feeling toward a party, and that the
feeling must be extrajudicial in nature, as under section 144.' The 1975
decision in Bowling v. Mathews 3 ' follows this interpretation. The Fifth
Circuit there states: "[The appellant] likewise appeals from the refusal of
the district judge to disqualify himself. An examination of his affidavit of
disqualification establishes that its asserted grounds are limited to actions of
the judge in the case at bar. These will not suffice."' 3 9 Such a view of
"personal bias or prejudice" is not consistent with the intent of the ABA,
nor with the above interpretation of the term "impartiality." By following
section 144 here, the courts only heighten already inadequate protection of a
litigant's confidence in the appearance of impartiality.
130. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351,
6355, where the unpopular "duty to sit" doctrine is discussed.
131. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
936 (1966); In re Eatonton Elec. Co., 120 F. 1010 (S.D. Ga. 1903).
132. 517 F.2d at 1052.
133. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351, 6356.
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While the "financial interest" and "impartiality" provisions of the revised section 455 appear to protect a litigant not only from actual bias, but
from the mere possibility of bias as well, the term "personal bias or prejudice" as interpreted by the courts offers no such protection. Thus, the
revision of section 455 has not resolved ambiguity within the statute, nor
does it assure litigants of a fair trial under a judge in whom they have
confidence. Such assurance should be made either by interpreting "personal
bias or prejudice" broadly or, preferably, by the use of a balancing test to
determine the judge's impartiality. Factors to be weighed should include the
interests of the judge, the interests of other litigants in the case, the interests
of society as a whole, and the concern of the affiant in a trial by an impartial
judge.
III.

CONCLUSION

The revision of section 455 solves problems of internal ambiguity and
discrepancy between section 144 and section 455. The personal bias or
prejudice test is now applied identically under both statutes. Although this
application under the two statutes provides uniformity, it increases the
effect of the ambiguity of the phrase "personal bias or prejudice." The
courts should reconsider the present interpretation of the phrase in the light
of the need not only to provide impartiality, but also the appearance of
impartiality.

